... | ... | @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ For a detailed comparison with Googles QUIC, see [this](QUIC) page. |
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| unreliable transmission | NO | **YES** | NO* * | **YES** | NO (?) |
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| byte-stream communication | YES | YES | YES | YES | NO |
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| datagram communication | NO | **YES** | NO | **YES** | YES (RPC) |
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| Forward Error Correction | NO | NO | NO | **YES** | NO |
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| header length (for data) | 38 (+options)| 32 | 9-45+?(including UDP)* * * * | **~29** (including UDP)| 52(with UDP) |
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| stun support for clients | NO | NO | NO | **Planned** | NO |
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| protocol-level [proxy](Proxy)| NO | NO | NO | **Planned** | NO |
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... | ... | @@ -29,7 +30,7 @@ For a detailed comparison with Googles QUIC, see [this](QUIC) page. |
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\* Perfect forward secrecy (PFS) must be explicitly enabled with proper algorithm support in TLS. QUIC provides PFS, but only after the connection setup, and the key for the initial authentication and key exchange is not connection-specific, but is regenerated every couple of minutes. This setup is not perfect but permits QUIC to avoid one RTT and as long as the interval between key regeneration is not long it can be considered secure.
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** QUIC can be hacked to do unreliable transmission by sending data in a new stream and then forgetting about that stream instead of tracking it. It does not support data spanning multiple packets or maintaining the same stream ID.
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** QUIC currently does not support unreliable transmission, but there is an ietf draft for the support
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***minimaLT perfect forward secrecy is not per-connection, and requires server and dns collaboration. See the [MinimaLT](MinimaLT) page for details.
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